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Abstract
While there is a growing body of research on the
success factors in crowdfunding campaigns, much less
is known about the factors that influence the success
of crowdfunding platforms. We begin to address this
gap in research by examining real estate
crowdfunding platforms (RECPs) which connect real
estate investors with real estate capital seekers. To
understand how entrepreneurs leverage technology in
this context, we drew on resource orchestration theory
and we conducted a multi-case analysis across seven
RECPs in the United States. We discovered that RECP
founders and executives view technology as a focal
resource orchestration mechanism that is critical for
platform success. We identified five higher-order
themes that describe entrepreneurial goals in
leveraging technology: efficiency, agility, scalability,
reach and personalization. We also examined how
different platforms solved the two-sided market launch
challenge and we found that entrepreneurs developed
a number of different strategies.

1. Introduction
Continuous evolution of information and
communication technologies (ICTs) provides a fertile
foundation for new forms of entrepreneurship. In this
study, we address the recent call for research on
questions arising at the intersection of technology and
entrepreneurship [33] and we examine the role of
technology in entrepreneurial venture development
across seven real estate crowdfunding platforms in the
United States. In this context, we evaluate how
individual
entrepreneurial
ventures
leverage
technology to acquire and orchestrate resources in
response to regulatory changes that afforded novel
entrepreneurial venture fundraising opportunities.
The emergent real estate crowdfunding platforms
represent a rapidly evolving domain within the broader
crowdfunding phenomenon. The platforms that are the
subject of our study collectively facilitated over $7.2
billion in real estate transactions over a period of just
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a few years. Despite the growing practical importance
of real estate crowdfunding, there is little in the way of
holistic theory on the factors that contribute to the
success of the real estate crowdfunding platforms.
This is in part due to the unique context in which the
platforms evolved.
Real estate crowdfunding platforms connect real
estate investors with real estate capital seekers,
referred to as sponsors in the industry. Prior to 2012,
general public solicitation of investments was
prohibited in the United States. The JOBS Act, which
was passed in 2012, afforded several new exemptions
for public investment solicitations that facilitated the
emergence of new types of crowdfunding platforms
[12, 47]. The changes in regulation represent an
important environmental consideration in our study.
However, we find that changes in regulation had
differing effects across the platforms that we
examined. While the regulatory changes enabled
market entry for several platforms, the indirect effects
that legitimized online crowdfunding as a more
general practice proved more important than the direct
regulatory effects for a number of platforms in our
study.
A further distinguishing characteristic of our study
is that we focus on the successful launch of
technology-enabled entrepreneurial businesses that
are two-sided markets. Two-sided markets pose a
double challenge for entrepreneurs in that they must
solve the parallel tasks of bringing each side of the
market to the platform. Real estate investors would
only want to join a platform that already has real estate
sponsors and vice versa. In this context, bringing the
two sides together when neither is already on the
platform poses a significant challenge. We examine
how different entrepreneurial ventures solved the twosided market challenge and we find that real estate
crowdfunding entrepreneurs developed a number of
different strategies.
To structure our analysis, we draw on the resource
orchestration theory [5, 46], which posits that
understanding how business ventures acquire,
recombine and leverage resources is central to
understanding how they achieve success. We examine
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the role of technology as the key resource
orchestration mechanism in platform-based ventures.
The following research questions guide our study: 1)
How do entrepreneurs leverage technology to
orchestrate resources to launch new platform-based
ventures? 2) How do entrepreneurs solve the twosided market challenge? To develop a holistic
theoretical
perspective,
we
follow
the
recommendations for theory development in emergent
contexts [16, 17] and we conduct multiple case study
analysis [57]. Interviews with the company founders
and executives as well as secondary data comprising
publicly available information about the individual
companies serve as the sources of data underlying our
analysis.
We found that the entrepreneurs in our study
recognized the transformative nature of ICT
innovations in real estate financing and they built
technology-based platforms to enable innovative real
estate fundraising practices. The entrepreneurs see the
respective platforms that they developed as a critical
source
of
competitive
advantage
through
encapsulation of innovative business practices within
the systems and achievement of efficiencies that
would not be otherwise possible. The entrepreneurs
continually invest in platform development to sustain
the initial advantage. In terms of the key factors for
launching two-sided platforms, we find that
entrepreneurs developed several different strategies
for successful launch. While some platforms chose to
internalize one side of the market, others seeded their
platforms by bringing either investors or sponsors onto
the platform first. These results contribute to the
ongoing discussion of effective seeding strategies in
multi-sided markets [14, 34].

2. Literature review and theoretical
foundations
There are several research areas that provide the
theoretical background for our work. First, real estate
crowdfunding is an emergent area within the broader
crowdfunding phenomenon. Second, real estate
crowdfunding platforms are important examples of
digital entrepreneurship uniquely affected by the focal
role of technology in these businesses. Third, real
estate crowdfunding platforms are two-sided markets
connecting capital seekers with capital providers. We
also review prior research on resource orchestration
that provides the overarching theoretical lens for our
study. In the following sections, we review and
synthesize the key studies on crowdfunding, digital
entrepreneurship, two-sided markets, and resource
orchestration theory.

2.1. Crowdfunding
Real estate crowdfunding platforms are a part of a
broader crowdfunding phenomenon. Crowdfunding
refers to many different types of activities whereby
individuals or companies solicit funding from a broad
audience, typically via the internet [3]. Four distinct
types of crowdfunding are commonly recognized.
Reward-based crowdfunding, exemplified by
Kickstarter, allows entrepreneurs as well as artists to
raise required funding for their projects [31]. Project
backers typically commit relatively small amounts and
they are commonly offered a reward in exchange for
the contribution. The rewards range from a discount
on the planned product or service to attendance of the
premiere for artistic performances. Project backers
receive no equity in the projects that they fund. There
are also platforms that enable purely altruistic
donations to different causes, e.g. GoFundMe.org.
These
platforms
exemplify
donation-based
crowdfunding activities [25].
Debt and equity-based crowdfunding platforms
broker connections between capital seekers and capital
providers who are primarily motivated by the expected
financial returns on their investment [1]. Individuals
and companies can participate on both sides of the
market. For example, LendingClub began as a peer-topeer (P2P) unsecured personal loan marketplace, but
evolved to include institutional investors as an
important group of participants on the platform [18].
Similarly, OnDeck began as a business-to-business
(B2B) marketplace for business loans and evolved to
include individual investors as an important source of
capital on the platform [29]. There are two important
distinctions between debt and equity-based
crowdfunding platforms in terms of the investor
risk/reward profile [27]. Debt-based crowdfunding
platforms typically offer a fixed interest rate and
repayment term (commonly 6-18 months), whereas
equity-based crowdfunding generally offers little
certainty for potential investors because new ventures
typically take 5-7 years to return capital to investors
and many entrepreneurial ventures lead to partial or
complete loss of the investment [56].
Real estate crowdfunding can involve different
legal structures that govern investor/platform/sponsor
relationships. While some platforms facilitate direct
investments in real estate loans that offer fixed interest
rates and repayment terms at origination, others offer
equity position in real estate investments that carry
much more uncertainty in terms of the potential
appreciation (or loss) and liquidity (ability to exit the
investment). Therefore, the investor risk/reward
profile varies significantly across the real estate
crowdfunding platform and that will be an important
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consideration in the evaluation of resource
orchestration that supported the launch of the
innovative product/service offerings across the
platforms.

2.2. Digital entrepreneurship
Online real estate crowdfunding platforms
leverage technology to offer innovative services to
both sides of the market. On one side, the platforms
provide real estate investment opportunities for
potential investors. On the other, by establishing a
more direct route to financing, the platforms provide
access to capital at a lower cost to the real estate
sponsors. Because technology plays a central role in
this context, real estate crowdfunding platforms
exemplify a case of digital entrepreneurship that
emerges at the intersection of entrepreneurship and
digital technologies [33].
While digital entrepreneurship is only beginning to
emerge as a focal point for research in information
systems, questions concerning the role of technology
in entrepreneurial ventures have been examined in the
past. For example, Kelley and Rice [24] examined the
role of alliances in successful technology
commercialization. The authors analyzed the
performance of 67 computer and telecom firms in the
United States and concluded that alliances helped the
ventures in this space to develop and commercialize a
broader base of intellectual property. Recognizing that
technology adoption is a complex social phenomenon
that involves a network of actors including regulators
and local governments, Garud and Karnoe [21]
compared the adoption of wind turbines in the United
States and Denmark. The authors concluded that the
broad adoption of novel technologies can proceed
through different routes, in part due to action from
different agents involved. Further, the authors
discovered that while breakthrough innovation
adoption does happen, more commonly, bricolage
through multi-agent involvement plays a key role in
the adoption of new technologies.
Universities often play a key role in the
development of new technologies. Markman et al. [30]
examined the structure of different University
Technology Transfer Offices (UTTOs) that are
typically tasked with commercializing new
technologies developed by universities and concluded
that a greater degree of independence of the UTTOs
was associated with the greater success in new
technology commercialization. More recent research
on technology commercialization examined how
network externalities affect the success of different
entrepreneurial strategies and found that the presence
of network externalities produced a complex set of
outcomes through interaction with the business

strategy choice [36]. Symeonidou et al. [48] examined
the
effects
of
international
technology
commercialization strategy and concluded that
intellectual property (IP) licensing produced the best
commercialization option for technology-based
ventures.
Focusing on the entrepreneurial process,
Doganova & Eyquem-Renault [13] explored how
technology entrepreneurs socialize their ventures with
the broader audience and found that entrepreneurs
commonly discuss their “business models” in order to
gauge interest among potential customers and
potential investors, thus revealing a unique role of
business models as a narrative tool in the
entrepreneurial process.
The
extant
research
on
technology
commercialization suggests that the evaluation of the
business model narratives that are being used by the
individual real estate crowdfunding platforms affords
an opportunity to gain insight on how entrepreneurial
ventures acquire, orchestrate and leverage the
resources across different real estate crowdfunding
platforms.
The recent call for digital entrepreneurship
research [33] noted that because the nature of
technology makes traditional firm boundaries more
“porous and fluid”, digital entrepreneurship is
characterized by less bounded forms that have an
evolving set of actors and less pre-defined outcomes.
Digital platforms, defined as “a shared set of services
and architecture that serves to host complementary
offering” [35], provide a particularly important
construct in the examination of the role of technology
in entrepreneurship because of the technology
capacity to produce unprompted change. Digital
platforms are typically multi-sided markets. In the
next section, we review prior research on two-sided
markets.

2.3. Two-sided markets
Two-sided markets are defined as “a platform
providing goods or services to two distinct end-users
where the platform attempts to set the price for each
type of end-user to get both sides on board” [40, 41].
Two-sided platforms create value by enabling
interactions among the agents. Network externalities,
i.e. the exponential relationship between the number
of participants and the platform value, have been a
focal point for research in economics that aims to
address the question of the optimal platform size [40,
41].
Cross-side network effects play an important role
in the success of two-sided markets. Platforms that
enjoy cross-side network effects often grow to the
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position of market dominance [32]. For example,
credit card payment processing platforms enjoy crossside network effects. A greater number of credit card
users incentivizes more merchants to accept specific
credit cards and, in turn, a broader acceptance of a
specific type of credit card by a greater number of
merchants leads to a greater value of a specific credit
card for the consumers. Because two-sided platforms
often enjoy cross-side network effects and
consequently grow to a position of dominance, there is
a growing body of research on the regulatory
implications of two-sided markets [55].
A parallel stream of research on two-sided markets
in economics focuses on the question of optimal
pricing by the platform providers [23, 43]. The optimal
strategy depends on the specific context, but it is not
uncommon for platforms to make the use of the
platform free for one side of the market, subsidized by
charging the participants on the other side. For
example, KickStarter does not charge project backers,
but the company does charge funding requestors.
There has also been some research on the key
factors that enable market entry by a competing twosided platform. The key consideration in the
competition among two-sided market platforms is the
market participant multi-homing, i.e. participation on
multiple platforms. Econometric models suggest that
limited degree of market participant lock-in exposes
incumbent platforms to competition from new entrants
[58]. Analysis of the effects of regulation on twosided markets suggests counterintuitive results, in that
regulation may benefit incumbent platforms by
erecting barriers to entry for new platforms [15].

2.5. Resource orchestration
Resource orchestration theory [8, 46] is an
extension of the resource based view (RBV) theory
[52, 53, 54] and it emphasizes the critical role of
management activities in resource orchestration as a
key factor in a company’s success. Resource
orchestration theory has been applied in a number of
studies focusing on entrepreneurial success. A study of
family firms in Switzerland suggested that
intergenerational involvement through participative
strategy plays a key role in the success of the family
firms [8]. A study of entrepreneurial firms in Sweden
suggested that resource orchestration through
managerial action had an amplifying effect on the
success of the firms [51]. Chadwick et al. [7] showed
that human resource orchestration through executive
commitment to human resource management systems
had a positive relationship with the firms’ financial
performance. Baert et al. [2] explored the key
activities among portfolio investors in startups and

suggested that harmonization of investment themes
was important to realizing positive returns. Carnes et
al. [6] offered a theoretical argument that new firms
must focus on resource acquisition. However,
Symeonidou and Nicolau [49] examined the effects of
investment in human capital by new ventures and
concluded that different industries have different
optimal human resource investment profiles. Overand under-investment in human resources is
associated with firm underperformance. Focusing on
the role of technology in resource orchestration, Liu et
al. [26] showed that technology alignment with the
business needs plays a key role in business
performance.
We draw on resource orchestration theory as the
overarching framework in our study. While the
resource orchestration theory emphasizes managerial
activity as the key success factor in entrepreneurial
ventures, it does not provide prescriptive guidance on
the types of activities that affect the entrepreneurial
firm success across different contexts. Given the
relative novelty of the real estate crowdfunding
phenomenon, the absence of an established dominant
theory in this domain, and the complexity of the
context—real estate platforms are two-sided
markets—we follow recommendations on theory
building in emergent contexts [16, 17] and we employ
multiple case study methodology [57] to gain insights
on the research questions motivating our study.

3. Methodology
We relied on inductive theory development from
multiple case analysis [16, 17] to identify themes that
describe entrepreneurial resource orchestration efforts
in the context of real estate crowdfunding platforms.
Case studies are acknowledged as a valuable
methodology for evidence-based theory development
because case studies can inspire new ideas and new
constructs [38]. Synthesis of insights across multiple
cases affords the opportunity to develop a level of
understanding that transcends individual cases [4, 42].
Integration of evidence across cases allows for
development of more generalizable evidence-based
theory [9].

3.1. Research context
Real estate crowdfunding platform operate within
the larger real estate markets. Real estate is the single
largest asset class globally. The value of real estate in
the United States is estimated at $70 trillion. Colliers
International estimates that $492 billion worth of
transactions for commercial and residential properties
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valued over $2.5 million were completed in the United
States in 2016 [10]. The “fix and flip” residential
market is estimated to have generated a further $45
billion in transactions [20].
Focusing on the typical agents involved in real
estate transactions, high value real estate asset
transactions are dominated by institutional investors
and sponsors, and there are typically multiple
intermediaries involved in the transactions. For
example, individual savings in a diversified retirement
account may include real estate investment trust
(REIT) holdings as a part of the individual investment
portfolio. REITs typically raise money from
investment management companies, perform due
diligence, invest and operate properties in which they
invest.
Prior to the passage of the JOBS Act, public
solicitation of investments was prohibited in the
United States. However, real estate sponsors could still
raise money from institutional and accredited
investors (individuals with income in excess of
$200,000 per year for two most recent years or assets
excluding the primary residence valued over $1
million) [45]. These, so called, private placements
could be done under Rule 506(b) of Regulation D (Reg
D) that provides a safe harbor exemption [45].
Solicitation of investment under Rule 506(b) still
requires the party raising funds to register the offering
with SEC.
Regulation A (Reg A), which was available to
companies prior to the passage of the JOBS Act,
limited the amount of funding that could be raised
from non-accredited investors to just $5 million and it
generally proved to be ineffective because of the low
cap on the funds that could be raised in relation to the
associated regulatory filing requirements [39]. The
JOBS Act contains several provisions which expanded
the exemptions for public investment solicitations
[44]. Title IV under the JOBS act afforded fundraising
of up to $20 million (Tier 1) or $50 million (Tier 2)
with simplified regulatory filing requirements. These
exemptions are known as Regulation A+ (Reg A+).

3.2. Case study selection
We sought to obtain the broadest possible sample
of real estate crowdfunding platforms for our analysis.
We identified nine real estate crowdfunding platforms
that were in operation at the beginning of the study in
August 2017. We solicited participation in the study
from the founders and executives from all nine
platforms. We were successful in getting founders
and/or executives from seven of the nine platforms to
participate in semi-structured interviews. Table 1

below provides a summary of the key differences
among the respective platforms included in our study.
One of the remaining two platforms that did not
respond to our invitations to participate in the study
ceased operations during our interview collection
period between September and October 2017.
Table 1. Platforms included in the analysis
Platform /
Model
Platform A
Sponsor led
platform
$1.4 billion
in the
portfolio of
investments
Platform B
Whole loan
platform

Platform C
Whole loan
platform
$489 mil in
originated
loans
Platform D
Sponsor led
platform
$875 million
raised
Platform E

Sources of
capital
Started with
accredited
investors,
expanded to
include nonaccredited.
Raised own
investment
fund.

Sources of
deal flow
Developers

Regulatory
compliance
Reg A, Reg
A+, Tier II,
Tier III

Accredited
and nonaccredited
investors

Fix and flip
sponsors

Institutional
investors,
accredited and
non-accredited
investors

Sponsors,
developers

Started with
Reg A,
expanded to
Reg A+,
Tier II, Tier
III
Reg A, Reg
A+

Wealthy
foreign
investors

The
company is
a codeveloper in
the projects.

Reg A

Wealthy
individuals

Sponsors,
developers

Not affected
because
provides
services to
sponsors.

Accredited
investors

Sponsors,
developers

Reg A+,
Tier II

Accredited
and nonaccredited
investors

Sponsors,
developers

Reg A+,
Tier II and
Tier III

Listing
platform
$3.75 billion
in funded
projects
Platform F
Sponsor-led
platform
Brokerdealer
Platform G
Listing
platform
$700 million
in
investments

We sought to obtain input from multiple
founders/executives at each company, however we
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were only successful at obtaining multiple interview
informants from two of the seven platforms. To
achieve validation of information across sources, in
addition to the primary interview data, we collected all
available information on the respective platform web
sites and triangulated our analysis across the data
sources to confirm information consistency. Table 2
summarizes the data sources underlying our analysis.
Table 2. Data sources
Platform
A
Platform
B
Platform
C
Platform
D
Platform
E
Platform
F
Platform
G

Primary data: Co-founder interview: 36
minutes, co-founder interview, 34 minutes.
Secondary data: 67 pages of documents
Primary: Executive interview, 25 minutes
Secondary data: 53 pages of documents
Primary data: Co-founder interview: 54
minutes.
Secondary data: 44 pages of documents
Primary data: Executive interview: 23
minutes.
Secondary data: 40 pages of documents
Primary data: Co-founder interview: 39
minutes.
Secondary data: 46 pages of documents
Primary data: Co-founder interview: 54
minutes
Secondary data: 47 pages of documents
Primary data: Co-founder interview: 22
minutes, Executive interview: 26 minutes
Secondary data: 33 pages of documents

3.3. Analytical approach
In our analysis, we followed the recommendations
for grounded theory development [11]. Grounded
theory development proceeds through iterative data
coding and inductive theory building steps [11]. In
coding the events, we focused on resource
orchestration, the role of technology in platform
development and the effects of regulatory changes on
the development of entrepreneurial ventures.

4. Results
4.1. Solving the two-sided market challenge
Focusing on the question of how the real estate
crowdfunding platforms which are the subject of our
study solved the two-sided market challenge, we find
that the companies executed a number of different
strategies. Platform F founders leveraged their friends
and family connections to guarantee funding to the
sponsors who were brought onto the platform first.
Platform C founders secured a commitment from an
external investor in the company to guarantee funding

for the first sponsor who offered an investment
opportunity on the platform and engaged in active
promotion prior to the platform launch to attract
potential investors. Rapid success of the first project
that was offered to investors on the platform led to a
flood of investor interest and jumpstarted the
platform’s growth.
Platform B, E and G founders leveraged their
connections within the real estate investor community
to recruit potential investors onto the respective
platforms so that the platforms would offer an
attractive source of financing to the sponsors that
followed the investors onto the platforms. Platform D
founders developed the platform to support the
fundraising for their own real estate projects. Platform
A founders initially used the deal flow from their own
real estate ventures to attract investor participation on
the platform. They subsequently expanded the list of
available investment opportunities to include
independently sponsored projects.

4.2. The role of technology in platform
development
In examining the role of technology as the key
resource orchestration mechanism across the
platforms in our study, we find that founders and
executives nearly uniformly recognize that the
technology enabling the platforms is the core asset in
their business. Importantly, the founders and
executives recognize the need to develop systems that
uniquely support the coordination functions specific to
their business. For example, Executive, Platform D
stated the following:
We have recently made a huge investment in terms
of time and resources in technology. We brought along
an in-house team, people that used to work in open
innovation at a large bank, and we propped these
people to develop internally an investment platform.
And that doesn't mean simply having a website like any
other crowdfunding platform. That means actually
typing the entire process. Meaning from the moment in
which a new investor comes along and they check the
investment on the website. They can do every single
part of the investment online, and we do also
background checks and all the back of it in
automatically. And we control that entire process
which is something that no real estate crowdfunding
platform is doing so far.
We find that efforts across platforms have focused
on developing technology to streamline processes that
serve the key function of coordinating the interactions
between the investors and the sponsors as well as the
reporting functions provided by the platform to each
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side. Co-founder, Platform A, shared the following
with us:
Being able to basically distribute directly over the
internet to the investor, reach out to the investor and
transact, that’s a critical one. The ability to essentially
maintain an extremely large investor base, servicing
assets, servicing investors and all those, essentially
require tougher technology. We can’t have tens of
thousands of investors, individual investors and
essentially maintain them through manual methods,
we need software systems that can basically track
every dollar and every dollar out exactly what
someone has owed and it would not be possible living
without technology.
This is echoed by a co-founder from Platform A:
We now have over 200,000 users on the site. I think
we have around 20,000 investors and we only have
two people now who are answering all of those
questions. The reason why we've been able to do that
is because every time someone writes in, we record
exactly what it is that they're asking about and we
categorize it basically according to a code and that
becomes a data point that we're then able to use to
help drive future iterations of the website, future
communications, ways that we can improve.
We also find that the founders and executive in real
estate crowdfunding platforms focus less on the
technology itself, but rather on the key benefits of
leveraging technology as a resource coordination
mechanism to support innovation. We identified five
second order themes that were mentioned by the
participants in our study. Due to the manuscript length
limitations, we are only able to present the summary
information about the identified themes here.
Efficiency:
 Cost savings through disintermediation –
platforms are able to offer better financing
terms to real estate sponsors.
 Encapsulation of business processes within
technology – platform investments in
systems that support the entire business
process end-to-end.
 Rapid regulatory reporting – simplification
of the reporting function.
 Lowering customer acquisition costs.
Agility:
 Fast response to investment opportunities –
fast underwriting for sponsor-led projects.
 Rapid response to regulatory changes –
adoption of Reg A+.
Scalability:
 Ability to serve large groups of investors.
 Replication of expert knowledge in
customer service management.
Reach:



Move beyond traditional real estate
investment practices which are typically
geographically bounded
 Expose market participants to new
opportunities
Personalization:
 Developing individual investment products
 Developing individual recommendations

5. Discussion
5.1. The role of technology in resource
orchestration in entrepreneurial ventures
The key result of our analysis is that entrepreneurs
and executives in real estate crowdfunding platforms
are keenly aware of the transformative role of
technology in digital entrepreneurship. However, they
do not see technology as a static artifact, but rather
perceive the technology as a coordinating mechanism
that unlocks opportunities for innovative business
practices. Cross-case analysis suggests that the
coordinating functions of technology can be distilled
to five distinct themes.
First, the entrepreneurs leverage technology to
achieve
operating
efficiencies
in
resource
orchestration. Real estate crowdfunding platforms
enable more direct interactions between real estate
sponsors and real estate investors. By the virtue of
disintermediating many stages in the traditional
institutional real estate investment process, real estate
crowdfunding platforms offer more attractive
financing terms to real estate sponsors and at the same
time the platforms open access to previously
inaccessible opportunities for real estate investors.
Second, because real estate crowdfunding
platforms encapsulate novel business practices within
the platforms, they are able to offer faster investment
decisions to the real estate sponsors and achieve
extreme efficiencies in acquiring and servicing their
clientele on both sides of the market. For example,
Platform A is able to service over 20,000 investors
with just two representatives because the platform
efficiently codifies new knowledge. The combination
of faster decision making and automation contributes
to the platform’s agility and scalability.
We also found that Internet-based platforms offer
benefits of reach and personalization. Real estate
investments have traditionally been geographically
limited, with both investors and sponsors having a
geographic focus. The real estate crowdfunding
platforms significantly expand the geographical reach
of investors and sponsors, offering new liquidity in the
real estate markets. The flexible nature of the platform
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technology enables each investor to enjoy a highly
personalized experience. Most of the real estate
crowdfunding platforms afford the investors an
opportunity to select the projects that they choose to
participate in, thus creating a highly personalized
investor experience on the respective platforms.
Platform A is the exception because it structures all
investments through a REIT structure, wherein all
investors effectively hold the same real estate asset
portfolio.

5.2. Solving the two-sided market challenge
The typical challenges of starting a new venture
(developing the product/service offering, achieving
market traction, scaling, etc.) are amplified in twosided platforms because the platforms have to
simultaneously solve the product/market fit for two
distinct groups of customers [19, 22]. However, we
observe that the founders of real estate platforms have
generally succeeded in solving this challenge and they
developed different solutions to the two-sided
platform challenge. While some platforms chose to
internalize the sponsor side of the market, thereby
simplifying the platform launch challenge to investor
recruitment, we find that the majority of the platforms
brought investors onto the platform first, effectively
guaranteeing funding for the first sponsor offerings. It
would be of interest to evaluate the generalizability of
this observation in other contexts.

5.3. Theoretical implications
Our study makes a number of contributions to
theory. The study is among the first to address the
recent call for digital entrepreneurship research [33].
We focused on the role of technology as a coordinating
mechanism for resource orchestration in real estate
crowdfunding platforms. In their essence, real estate
crowdfunding platforms solve the matching problem
between financial resources (investors) and real estate
investment opportunities (sponsors) and therefore, the
resource coordination task is inherently embedded in
the platforms. Consistent with the theoretical
predictions [33], the coordination tasks performed by
the platforms are dynamic because the resources on
both sides of the platforms are very fluid. Both
investors and sponsors have a lot of flexibility in terms
of their engagement with the individual platforms. In
this context, platform founders are keenly aware of the
need to balance both sides of the market to assure that
both sponsors and investors have a positive experience
on the platforms.
Our study also contributes to the growing body of
research applying resource orchestration theory as a

helpful theoretical perspective in evidence-based
entrepreneurship research [2, 5, 8, 46, 49]. Resource
orchestration theory emphasizes that understanding
how businesses acquire, recombine and leverage
resources is central to understanding business success
[8, 46]. While our initial focus on the technologyempowered activities uncovered a diverse set of
entrepreneurial activities involved in building twosided platforms, inductive analysis of the emergent
higher-order themes across the activities suggests that
there are higher-order goals focused on achieving
efficiency,
agility,
scalability,
reach
and
personalization that are being pursued by the
platforms. These themes provide the foundation for
future research that can evaluate the generalizability of
these higher-order themes in resource orchestration in
technology-enabled platforms in other contexts.
We also make a contribution to the broader
crowdfunding literature. While real estate
crowdfunding has gained momentum in practice [28],
there has been relatively little research in this domain
[50]. Our study offers the foundation for further
research, by defining the key agents in this area of
practice (investors, sponsors and platforms),
documenting the diversity of real estate crowdfunding
platform types and outlining different governance
structures that emerge (direct investments, REITs and
listing platforms). The seven platforms in our study
target different sets of investors (unaccredited,
accredited and institutional) and work with different
types of individual and institutional sponsors using
different regulatory structures (Reg D, Reg A, Reg
A+). The platforms engage in different degrees of
investment opportunity vetting, ranging from
solicitation of investments in own property
development projects, to performing due diligence on
investment opportunities listed on the platform, to
simply listing the opportunities as a marketing service
to sponsors. These observations are consistent with
prior theoretical arguments that demand heterogeneity
may affect the diversity of the business forms [37].
The explication of the emergent platform
configurations affords an opportunity to examine how
the configuration choices will affect the development
of the respective platforms as the real estate
crowdfunding market matures. One of the apparent
trends is that lowering the barriers to listing sponsorled projects on the platform is associated with
significant growth in the volume of transactions.
Platform E in our study offers only listing services and
it reports having brokered over $3.75 billion in
transactions, far more than any of the other platforms.
Our work also has important implications for the
research on multi-sided platforms. Multi-sided
platforms are a notoriously challenging type of
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entrepreneurial ventures [19, 22]. We find that at least
seven entrepreneurial teams have successfully solved
the two-sided platform launch challenge in real estate
crowdfunding. Notably, the platforms in our study
have pursued different strategies in solving the
challenge. Two platforms have effectively internalized
the demand side of the market to reduce the challenge
to just attracting the investors, while four of the
remaining five brought the investors onto the
platforms first to attract sponsors onto the platforms
and one launched the platform with a sponsor as the
first entry. These observations suggest that there may
not be a single dominant strategy for two-sided
platform launch. This is in contrast with prior
theoretical research focused on the identification of the
optimal platform seeding strategies [14, 34].
Finally, our study also contributes to research on
the role of regulation in entrepreneurial entry. We
find that four of the seven platforms in our study
predate the JOBS Act, which is commonly perceived
as the key facilitating event for the emergence of debt
and equity based crowdfunding platforms [47]. These
findings suggest that in order to understand the
potential impact of new regulation on entrepreneurial
venture creation, it is important to examine existing
business ecosystem to understand how existing
businesses may be impacted by the new deregulation
efforts and whether the existing firms may be the de
facto beneficiaries of deregulation, whereas the
intended effect may have been primarily focused on
the creation of new ventures.
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